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CONTRACT DESIGN WITH COSTLY CONVEX SELF-CONTROL∗
YUSUFCAN MASATLIOGLU§, DAISUKE NAKAJIMA†, AND EMRE OZDENOREN‡
In this note, we solve the pricing problem of a profit-maximizing monopolist who faces
consumers with convex self-control preferences. The idea that self-control costs can be con-
vex has been introduced by Fudenberg and Levine [2006]. Building on Gul and Pesendorfer
[2001], Noor and Takeoka [2010, 2015] provide axiomatic characterizations of convex self-
control. Monopolistic contracting with consumers who have self-control problems was stud-
ied by DellaVigna and Malmendier [2004], Eliaz and Spiegler [2006], Heidhues and Koszegi
[2010], among others. The previous literature has highlighted that the monopolist can ex-
ploit naive consumers by offering them indulging contracts with two alternatives. Our earlier
work, Masatlioglu et al. [2019] builds on Eliaz and Spiegler [2006] and shows that when con-
sumers have limited willpower preferences, monopolist offers compromising contracts with
three alternatives. This note extends the solution of that problem to naive consumers with
convex self-control preferences.
1. Model
We denote the finite set of alternatives available to the monopolist by X . A contract C is a
menu of offers, where each offer is an alternative with an associated price, i.e., C = {(s, p(s)) :
s ∈ S ⊂ X}. We consider a two-period model of contracting between a monopolist and
a consumer. In the first period, the monopolist offers the consumer a contract C. The
consumer can accept or reject the contract. If the consumer accepts the contract, in the
second period, he chooses an offer from the contract and pays its price to the monopolist.
If the consumer rejects the contract, then he receives his outside option normalized to zero.
We assume that both parties are committed to the contract once accepted.
The monopolist’s profit from selling alternative s at price p(s) is p(s)− c (s) . The produc-
tion cost is incurred only for the service that the consumer chooses from the menu.
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1
2We assume that the consumer has costly convex self-control preferences where the cost
function is given by ϕ : R+ → R+. We assume that ϕ is a convex, continuous, strictly
increasing function such that ϕ(0) = 0. We assume that the consumer is naive in the sense
that he believes he has no self-control problem, i.e., he believes that from a contract C
he will choose the offer (s, p(s)) that maximizes U (s, p(s)) = u(s) − p(s). In reality, the
consumer’s second period choices are governed by the costly convex self-control model. This
means that from C the consumer chooses the offer (s, p(s)) that maximizes U (s, p(s)) −
ϕ
(
max
(s′,p(s′))∈C
V (s′, p(s′))− V (s, p(s))
)
where V (s, p(s)) = v(s)− p(s).
To simplify the analysis, we assume that u−c and v−c have unique maximizers xu and xv
in A. In other words, xu and xv are the most efficient alternatives with respect to u and v.
To make the problem interesting, we assume that xu 6= xv. We define the difference between
the temptation value and the utility value of an alternative s as its excess temptation and
denote it by e (s) ≡ v (s)−u (s) . We further assume that e has a unique maximizer, z∗, and
a unique minimizer, y∗, in A.
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p
e(z)e(x)
temptation cost of (x, p(x)) wrt (z, p(z))
temptation difference between (x, p(x)) and (z, p(z))
p(z)− u(z)
p(x)− u(x)
Figure 1. Alternatives indifferent to (x, p(x)) when they are the most tempt-
ing in a menu.
Next we introduce Figure 1 that we use extensively in the analysis below. Fix an arbitrary
alternative (x, p(x)) with excess temptation e(x) (the red point). For any v ≥ v(x) − p(x)
the blue line corresponds to p(x) − u(x) + φ(v − v(x) + p(x)). Thus if (x, p(x)) is in a
menu where the temptation value of the most tempting alternative is v, the light blue
line gives the negative of the overall utility of (x, p(x)). Suppose (x, p(x)) is in a menu
3where the most tempting alternative is (z, p(z)) with excess temptation e(z) (the black
point). Then we have v = v(z) − p(z) and the negative of the overall utility of (x, p(x)) is
p(x) − u(x) + φ(v(z) − p(z) − v(x) + p(x)). At the same time, from the iso-e line we see
that p(z)− u(z) = p(x) − u(x) + φ(v(z)− p(z)− v(x) + p(x)), which is the negative of the
overall utility of (z, p(z)) (which has no temptation cost). But this means that (x, p(x)) and
(z, p(z)) are indifferent. Hence, the blue line traces all the alternatives which are indifferent
to (x, p(x)) when they are the most tempting alternative in the menu.
1.1. Solving for Optimal Contract. First, we look for the revenue maximizing contract
that sells an alternative x. W.l.o.g. we will restrict attention to three types of contracts:
commitment, indulging and compromising.
Commitment Contract: In this case, the monopolist sells x at price p(x) = u(x).
Indulging Contract: Monopolist chooses x, p(x), y and p(y) to maximize p(x) subject
to
u (y)− p(y) ≥ 0
u (x)− p(x) ≥ u (y)− p(y)− ϕ (v (x)− p(x)− v (y) + p(y))
For a given y, increasing p(y) relaxes the second constraint, hence the first constraint must
be binding. This implies that:
u (x)− p(x) ≥ −ϕ (v (x)− p(x)− e(y)) .
This means that we choose y to minimize e(y). Hence y∗ and p(y∗) = u(y∗). The second
constraint is also binding implying that:
(1) pind(x) = u (x) + ϕ(v(x)− p(x)− e(y∗)).
Compromising Contract: Monopolist chooses p(x), y, p(y), z, p(z) to maximize p(x)
subject to
u (y)− p(y) ≥ 0(2)
u (x)− p(x)− ϕ (v (z)− p(z)− v (x) + p(x)) ≥ u (y)− p(y)− ϕ (v (z)− p(z)− v (y) + p(y))(3)
u (x)− p(x)− ϕ (v (z)− p(z)− v (x) + p(x)) ≥ u (z)− p(z)(4)
Note that the consumer prefers (x, p(x)) to both (y, p(y)) and (z, p(z)). As usual (y, p(y))
is the bait. In the indulging contract (x, p(x)) has dual roles. It is both the chosen and the
tempting alternative. In the compromising contract, the role of the tempting alternative is
4instead given to (z, p(z)). While we cannot solve the optimal compromising contract explic-
itly, we illustrate it graphically. This helps us to show that in this model the compromising
contract always dominates the indulging contract for strictly convex cost functions.
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A
temptation cost of (x, pcomp) wrt (z∗, p(z∗))
temptation cost of (y∗, p(y∗)) wrt (z∗, p(z∗))
p(z∗)− u(z∗)
p
comp
− u(x)
p
ind
− u(x)
Figure 2. Revenue maximizing commitment, indulging and compromising
contracts for selling x.
In this model, all three constraints are always binding and y = y∗ and z = z∗. Figure 2 il-
lustrates how to construct the optimal contract. First note that since constraint (2) is always
binding and u(y∗) = p(y∗). Since (3) and (4) bind, the consumer must be indifferent between
all three contracts in the optimal contract. This means that the monopolist (i) sets the price
of z∗ as p(z∗) such that (y∗, u(y∗)) and (z∗, p(z∗)) lie on the blue line starting from (y∗, u(y∗)),
and (ii) sets the price of x as pcomp such that (x, pcomp) and (z∗, p(z∗)) lie on the blue line
starting from (x, pcomp). Hence, the optimal contract is {(x, pcomp), (y∗, u(y∗)), (z∗, p(z∗))}
and the prices are given by two implicit equations:
(5) p(z∗) = u (z∗) + ϕ (v (z∗)− p(z∗)− e (y∗))
and
(6) pcomp = u (x) + p(z∗)− u(z∗)− ϕ (v (z∗)− p(z∗)− v (x) + pcomp) .
To find the indulging contract to sell x, the monopoly needs to set the price of x at pind
such that (x, pind) and (y∗, u(y∗)) lie on the blue line starting from (y∗, p(y∗)) (see Equation
(1)). As can be seen from the figure, the compromising contract generates higher revenue
compared to both the indulging and the commitment contracts for each x. If the cost
function is strictly convex, then it strictly dominates the others.
5Figure 4 illustrates the optimal contract. Given the above discussion, we know that it is
a compromising contract. We plot for each x the optimal compromising contract selling x
which is the dark blue line in the figure. Since the cost function is convex, this line must
be concave. The product sold in the optimal contract is illustrated by the point D, where
the dark blue line is tangent to the iso-profit line. Recall that the iso-profit line has zero
(infinite) slope at the point where it crosses the iso-e line for xu (xv). Since the slope of the
blue line is strictly positive and finite, D must have excess temptation strictly between e(xu)
and e(xv). Hence, the optimal contract always sacrifices efficiency for exploitation.
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D
Figure 3. Optimal Contract
1.2. Solving the Revenue Maximizing Contract for a Piecewise Linear Cost Func-
tion. The analysis in the previous section provides two useful insights into optimal contracts
when the consumer has costly convex self-control preferences. First, we show that compro-
mising contracts are strictly optimal when the cost function is strictly convex, and second,
there is always loss of efficiency. However, convex cost function does not lend itself to
comparative static analysis since there is no obvious analogue of the willpower parameter
that controls the consumer’s level of self-control. In this section, we propose a piece-wise
linear and weakly convex cost function. The position of the kink is where the consumer’s
temptation cost starts increasing more rapidly and can be interpreted as the analogue of
the willpower stock in the limited willpower model. Specifically, we solve for the revenue
maximizing contract for the following specification.
6(7) ϕ(x) =


lx if x ≤ w
k(x− w) + lw if x > w
where k > 1 > l > 0.
Indulging contract: In this case the monopolist offers y∗ at price p(y∗) = u(y∗). We
find pind by solving (1) as
(8) pind =


u(x) + l(v(x)− e(y∗))
1 + l
if e(x)− e(y∗) ≤ (1 + l)w
u(x) + k(v(x)− e(y∗)− w) + lw
1 + k
if e(x)− e(y∗) > (1 + l)w
We now show that the indulging contract is better than the commitment contract. Suppose
x 6= y∗ so that the indulging contract is distinct from the commitment contract. Assume
e(x)− e(y∗) ≤ (1 + l)w. By definition,
v(x)− u(x) > e(y∗)
if and only if
u(x) + l(v(x)− e(y∗)) > (1 + l)u(x).
if and only if indulging contract is strictly better.
v(x)− u(x) > e(y∗).
Assume e(x) − e(y∗) > (1 + l)w, which implies e(x) − e(y∗) − w > 0 if and only if
k(v(x)− u(x)− e(y∗)−w) > 0 if and only if u(x) + k(v(x)− e(y∗)−w)+ lw > ku(x) + u(x)
if and only if
u(x) + k(v(x)− e(y∗)− w) + lw > (1 + k)u(x)
if and only if the indulging contract is strictly better. Hence the indulging contract is strictly
better than the commitment contract.
Compromising Contract: To solve for the compromising contract, we first need to
solve for p(z∗) from (5), which gives us:
(9) p(z∗) =


u(z∗) + l(v(z∗)− e(y∗))
1 + l
if e(z∗)− e(y∗) ≤ (1 + l)w
u(z∗) + k(v(z∗)− e(y∗)− w) + lw
1 + k
if e(z∗)− e(y∗) > (1 + l)w
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Figure 4. Optimal Contract
Substituting p(z∗) in each range into (6) and solving the resulting equation, we get
(10)
pcomp =


u(x) + lv(x)
1 + l
+
k − l
(1 + k)(1 + l)
e(z∗)−
k
1 + k
e(y∗)−
k − l
1 + k
w if e(z∗)− e(x) ≤ (1 + l)w
u(x) + kv(x)
1 + k
−
k
1 + k
e(y∗) if e(z∗)− e(x) > (1 + l)w
We next compare the compromising and the indulging contracts. If e(z∗)−e(y∗) ≤ (1+l)w
(which implies e(x) − e(y∗) ≤ (1 + l)w), the indulging and the compromising contracts
generate the same revenue. This happens since the most tempting alternative cannot “block”
the “bait alternative” which is y∗. Hence, w.l.o.g. the contract that maximizes revenue is
an indulging contract and sells x at price
pind =
u(x) + l(v(x)− e(y∗))
1 + l
.
If e(z∗) − e(y∗) > (1 + l)w, comparing the revenue in all possible cases we see that the
contract that maximizes revenue is a compromising contract and sells x at price:
pcomp =


u(x) + lv(x)
1 + l
+
k − l
(1 + k)(1 + l)
e(z∗)−
k
1 + k
e(y∗)−
k − l
1 + k
w if e(z∗)− e(x) ≤ (1 + l)w
u(x) + kv(x)
1 + k
−
k
1 + k
e(y∗) if e(z∗)− e(x) > (1 + l)w
1.2.1. Optimal Contract. Next we find which alternative the monopolist should sell to maxi-
mize its profit. From the set {x : e(z∗)− e(x) ≤ (1+ l)w}, it is optimal to sell the maximizer
of
u(x) + lv(x)
1 + l
− c(x). From the set {x : e(z∗) − e(x) ≥ (1 + l)w}, it is optimal to sell the
8maximizer of
u(x) + kv(x)
1 + k
− c(x). Hence the optimal contract sells either
argmax
x:e(z∗)−e(x)≤(1+l)w
u(x) + lv(x)
1 + l
− c(x) or argmax
x:e(z∗)−e(x)≥(1+l)w
u(x) + kv(x)
1 + k
− c(x)
whichever generates the higher profit. Hence we get the following result.
Proposition 1. (1) For any e(z∗) − e(xk) ≥ (1 + l)w, the optimal contract is the best
compromising contract selling xk at
p(xk) =
u(xk) + kv(xk)− ke(y
∗)
1 + k
.
(2) For any e(z∗) − e(xk) < (1 + l)w < e(z
∗) − e(xl), the optimal contract is the best
compromising contract, which sells an alternative between xl and xk.
(3) For any e(z∗) − e(xl) ≤ (1 + l)w < e(z
∗) − e(y∗), the optimal contract is the best
compromising contract that sells xl at
p(xl) =
u(xl) + lv(xl)
1 + l
+
k − l
(1 + k)(1 + l)
e(z∗)−
k
1 + k
e(y∗)−
k − l
1 + k
w.
(4) For any e(z∗)−e(y∗) ≤ (1+ l)w, the optimal contract is the indulging contract selling
xl at
p(xl) =
u(xl) + l(v(xl)− e(y
∗))
1 + l
.
v
p
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Figure 5. Optimal Contract for different levels of w
Now, we shall consider how the optimal contract, the profit, and the naive consumer’s
welfare changes as the consumer’s willpower changes. In Figure 5, for comparison we provide
9the contract curve for the limited willpower model that we derived in Masatlioglu et al.
[2019], given by the red line. The blue line is the contract curve for the piece-wise linear
model. For any point on the contract curve, by moving down the iso-e line, we can find out
the product sold to the consumer by the optimal contract. The y-coordinate of the point
gives us the price of this product in excess of its utility value. Hence as we move down the
contract curve monopolist’s profit declines and consumer’s welfare increases.
When w is below a certain level, the product sold under the optimal contract and its price
remain the same, which indicates that a small increase in w does not help the consumer at all.
This happens on the upper-left corner of the contract curve in Figure 5 which corresponds
to w ∈ [0,
e(z∗)− e(xk)
1 + l
]. In this range, since monopolist sells xk at the same price, both the
monopolist’s profit and consumer’s welfare do not change.
As the w increases we enter the range (w ∈ (
e(z∗)− e(xk)
1 + l
,
e(z∗)− e(xl)
1 + l
)) which corre-
sponds to the positive-sloped portion of the contract curve. In this range the excess tempta-
tion of the product sold goes down from e(xk) to e(xl), its price and the monopolist’s profit
drop, and the consumer’s welfare increases.
The next range (w ∈ (
e(z∗)− e(xl)
1 + l
,
e(z∗)− e(y∗)
1 + l
)) corresponds to the linear decreasing
portion of the contract curve. Unlike the limited willpower model, here, exploitation requires
inefficiency since the optimal contract sells the inefficient alternative xl at an exploitative
price exceeding its utility value. In this range the excess temptation of the product remains
constant at e(xl), its price and the monopolist’s profit drop, and the consumer’s welfare
increases.
Lastly, at the lower-right hand corner of the contract curve (w ∈ [
e(z∗)− e(y∗)
1 + l
,∞)), the
nature of the optimal contract changes since the monopolist sells the inefficient alternative xl
using the indulging contract at an exploitative price. Independent of willpower, the naivety
always hurts the consumer.
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